In this paper we present a sufficient condition for the existence of a solution for an equilibrium problem on an Hadamard manifold and under suitable assumptions on the sectional curvature, we propose a framework for the convergence analysis of a proximal point algorithm to solve this equilibrium problem in finite time. Finally we offer an application to personal equilibrum problems as behavioral traps problems, using a recent "variational rationality" approach of human behavior.
recent years, extensions to Riemannian manifolds of concepts and techniques which fit in Euclidean spaces are natural. Some algorithms for solving variational inequalities and minimization problems which involve monotone operators have been extended from Hilbert space framework to more general setting of Riemannian manifolds; see Ferreira et al. [14] , [12] , Li et al. [15] and Wang et al. [16] . One reason for the success of techniques extension to the Riemannian setting is the possibility to transform nonconvex problems in linear context in convex problems by introducing a suitable metric; see Cruz Neto et al. [17] and Rapcsák [18] .
In regard to the minimization problem where the constrained set is the whole manifold, Bento and Cruz Neto in [19] showed that the proximal point method has finite termination in the particular case where the objective function is convex and each minimizer is a weak sharp minimum (see Li et al. [20] for a definition).
Following the ideas presented by Moudafi in [21] , we present a condition about the bifunction F that, in particular, retrieves the notion of weak sharp minima, and we prove the finite termination of any sequence generated from our iterative process. In particular, the finite termination result in [19] is extended to minimization problems whose constrained set is not necessarily the whole manifold and we obtain a resulted of finite convergence to the proximal point methods for finding singularities of single valued monotone vector fields (see, for instance [13] and Cruz Neto et al. [22] ) and, hence, for the variational inequality problem (see Németh [23] ) among others.
The organization of our paper is as follows. In Section 2, we give some elementary facts on Riemannian manifolds and convexity needed for reading of this paper. In Section 3, we present a sufficient condition for existence of a solution for the equilibrium problem on Hadamard manifolds under similar conditions required in the linear case. In Section 4, the proximal point algorithm for equilibrium problems on Hadamard manifolds is presented, convergence analysis is derived and, under mild assumption, a finite termination result is proved. In Section 5, we give a behavioral application to the so called personal equilibrium problems where agents have reference dependent utility functions and variable reference points (see, Kőszegi and Rabin [24] ),
Preliminary

Riemanian Geometry
In this section, we recall some fundamental and basic concepts needed for reading this paper. These results and concepts can be found in the books on Riemannian geometry, see do Carmo [27] and Sakay [28] .
Let M be a n-dimensional connected manifold. We denote by T x M the n-dimensional tangent space of M at x, by T M = ∪ x∈M T x M the tangent bundle of M and by X (M ) the space of smooth vector fields over M . When M is endowed with a Riemannian metric . , . , with the corresponding norm denoted by . , then M is a Riemannian manifold. Recall that the metric can be used to define the length of piecewise smooth curves γ : [a, b] → M joining x to y, i.e., γ(a) = x and γ(b) = y, by l(γ) := b a γ ′ (t) dt, and moreover, by minimizing this length functional over the set of all such curves, we obtain a Riemannian distance d(x, y)
inducing the original topology on M . We denote by B(x, ǫ) the Riemannian ball on M with center x and radius ǫ > 0. A vector field V along γ is said to be parallel iff ∇ γ ′ V = 0. If γ ′ itself is parallel we say that γ is a geodesic. Given that the geodesic equation ∇ γ ′ γ ′ = 0 is a second-order nonlinear ordinary differential equation, we conclude that the geodesic γ = γ v (., x) is determined by its position x and velocity v at x. It is easy to verify that γ ′ is constant. We say that γ is normalized iff γ ′ = 1. The restriction of a geodesic to a closed bounded interval is called a geodesic segment. Given points x, y ∈ M , we denote the geodesic segment from x to y by [x, y]. We usually do not distinguish between a geodesic and its geodesic segment, as no confusion can arise. A geodesic segment joining x to y in M is said to be minimal iff its length equals d(x, y) and the geodesic in question is said to be a minimizing geodesic. . Furthermore, are known some similar geometrical properties to the existing in Euclidean space R n , such as, given two points there exists an unique geodesic segment that joins them. Now, we present a geometric property which will be very useful in the convergence analysis.
Let us recall that a geodesic triangle ∆(x 1 x 2 x 3 ) of a Riemannian manifold is the set consisting of three distinct points x 1 ,x 2 ,x 3 called the vertices and three minimizing geodesic segments γ i+1 joining x i+1 to x i+2 called the sides , where i = 1, 2, 3(mod 3). As mentioned in [7] (see Bridson and Haefliger [29] ), it follows that:
In this paper, all manifolds M are assumed to be Hadamard and finite dimensional.
Convexity
A set Ω ⊂ M is said to be convex iff any geodesic segment with end points in Ω is contained in Ω, that is,
Given B ⊂ M , we denote by conv(B) the convex hull of B, that is, the smallest convex subset of M containing B. Let Ω ⊂ M be a convex set. A function f : Ω → R is said to be convex iff for any geodesic
The set of all subgradients of f at p, denoted by ∂f (p), is called the subdifferential of f at p. It is known that if f is convex and M is an Hadamard manifold, then ∂f (p) is a nonempty set, for each p ∈ Ω; see Udriste [30, Theorem 4.5, page 74].
Let B ⊂ M be a non-empty, convex and closed set. The distance function associated with B is given by
It is well-known (see [12, Corollary 3.1] ) that for each x ∈ M there exists a unique elementx ∈ B such that exp −1
In this case,x is the projection of x onto the set B which we will denote by P B (x). 
Equilibrium Problem
In this section, following the ideas shown in [6] , we present a sufficient condition for the existence of solution of equilibrium problems on Hadamard manifolds. We chose to present a proof only for the main result. With the exception to the proof of Proposition 3.1, the proof of the other results can be extended, from those presented in linear environments (see [6, 5] ), with minor adjustments to the nonlinear context of this paper.
From now on, Ω ⊂ M will denote a nonempty closed convex set, unless explicitly stated otherwise. Given a bifunction F : Ω × Ω → R satisfying the property F (x, x) = 0, for all x ∈ Ω, the equilibrium problem in the Riemannian context (denoted by EP) consists in:
In this case, the bifunction F is called an equilibrium bifunction. As far as we know, this problem was considered firstly, in this context in [7] , where the authors pointed out important problems, which are retrieved from (3.1). Particularly, given V ∈ X (M ), if
2) (3.1) reduces to the variational inequality problem; see, for instance [23] . Problems that appear, for instance, in many micro-economical models devoted to maximize utilities. Indeed, the absence of convexity allows us to obtain situations where this important class of problems can not be considered as a VIP in the sense that their possible representation in this format would lead us to a problem, whose solution set contains points that do not necessarily belong to the solution set of the original optimization problem. On the other hand even in the absence of convexity, this class of problems can be placed on the EP format.
Definition 3.1. Let F : Ω × Ω → R be a bifunction. F is said to be
i) Clearly, monotonicity implies pseudomonotonicity, but the converse does not hold even in a linear context, see, for instance, Iusem and Sosa [5] .
ii) If F is pseudomonotone and, forx,ỹ ∈ Ω, F (x,ỹ) > 0 implies F (ỹ,x) < 0. Indeed, let us suppose, for contradiction, that F (ỹ,x) = 0 (in particular F (ỹ,x) ≥ 0). From the pseudomonotonicity of F it follows that F (x,ỹ) ≤ 0, which is an absurdity, and the affirmation is proved.
Next result was presented by Colao et al. in [7] and is fundamental to establish our existence result for the EP.
Proposition 3.1. Let B ⊂ M be a closed convex subset and H : B → 2 B be a mapping such that, for each y ∈ B, H(y) is closed. Suppose that
Proof. See [7] .
Unless stated to the contrary, in the remainder of this paper we assume that F : Ω × Ω → R is a bifuntion satisfying the following assumptions:
H2) For every x ∈ Ω, y → F (x, y) is convex and lower semicontinuous;
For each y ∈ Ω, let us define:
From this set, we can consider the following convex feasibility problem (denoted by CFP):
As far as we know, this problem was first studied, in the Riemannian context, by Bento and Melo in [31] , in the particular case where the domain of F is M × {1, . . . , m}. In this case, y ∈ {1, . . . , m} and Ω is the whole M.
Next result establishes a relationship between CFP and EP.
Lemma 3.1. The solution set of CFP is contained in the solution set of EP.
Remark 3.3. Note that, as it is in the Euclidean context, the equality between the sets in the previous lemma in general does not happens, see [5] . However, in the particular case where F is pseudomonotone, the equality is immediately verified.
Take z 0 ∈ M fixed. For each k ∈ N consider the following set:
Note that Ω k is a nonempty set, for k ∈ N sufficiently large. For simplicity, we can suppose, without loss of generality, that Ω k is a nonempty set for all k ∈ N. Moreover, as Ω k is contained in the closed ball
it is a bounded set. On the other hand, since d(·, z 0 ) is a continuous and convex function (this follows from Remark 2.1), Ω k is a convex and closed set and, hence, compact (see the Ropf-Rinow's Theorem). We denote, by Ω 0 k , the following set:
Then, F (x, y) ≥ 0, for all y ∈ Ω, i.e.,x is a solution for (3.1).
Assumption 3.1. Given k ∈ N, for all finite set {y 1 , . . . , y m } ⊂ Ω k , one has
Remark 3.4. Note that, in the particular case where F is pseudomonotone, the property described by the previous assumption is naturally verified. Indeed, let y 1 , . . . , y m ∈ Ω k , takeȳ ∈ conv({y 1 , . . . , y n }) and let us
Now, define the following set B := {x ∈ Ω k : F (ȳ, x) < 0}. In the particular case where F is pseudomonotone, using (3.3) and taking into account that B is convex (this follows from H2), we conclude thatȳ ∈ B (see item ii) of Remark 3.2). But this contradicts H1 and the affirmation is proved.
infinity as k goes to infinity. Then, there exists x * ∈ Ω and k 0 ∈ N such that
It is worth noting that this last assumption has been presented by Iusem et al. [6] , in a space with a linear structure. It is a sufficient condition for the existence of solutions of the equilibrium problem EP.
Next result (see [5] for similar results, in the linear setting) assure us that Assumption 3.2 is a weaker sufficient condition than the coercivity assumption used by Colao et al. [7] , for the existence of solutions of EP.
Proposition 3.2. Let B ⊂ M be a compact set and y 0 ∈ B ∩ Ω a point such that F (x, y 0 ) < 0, for all
The following is the main result of this section. Proof. Recall that Ω k is a convex and compact set for each k ∈ N. Now, given k ∈ N and y ∈ Ω, note that L F (k, y) is a compact set. Indeed, this fact follows from the definition of L F (k, y) combined with assumption H2 (F (y, ·) is a lower semicontinuous function on Ω) and compactness of Ω k . Now, since Assumption 3.1 holds true, using Proposition 3.1 with B = Ω k and H(y) = L F (k, y), we conclude that, for each k ∈ N,
Therefore, using again Lemma 3.2, we conclude that z k ′ solves EP, and the proof is complete.
Next example was inspired by [7, Example 3.4] . It illustrates the usefulness of the our previous result, in the sense that it applies to some situations not covered in the linear setting. For other papers that highlight such advantage, in regard to the linear setting, see [22, 31] .
and consider the following bifunction F : Ω × Ω → R, given by:
Note that Ω is indeed a not convex set in R 3 . So, an equilibrium problem defined on Ω cannot be solved by using the classical results known in the linear context. Let (H n , , ) be the Riemannian manifold, where
and , is the Riemannian metric x, y := x 1 y 1 + x 2 y 2 + . . . + x n y n − x n+1 y n+1 (Lorentz metric). As noted in [7] , (H n , , ) is a Hadamard manifold with sectional curvature −1 and, given initial conditions x ∈ H n , v ∈ T x H n ( v = 1), the normalized geodesic γ : R → H n , is given by:
Hence, we obtain the following expression for the Riemannian distance d:
Again, as observed in [7] , Ω is a convex set which is immersed in the Hadamard manifold M :
Using the expression of the geodesic curves, it can be deduced that F is a convex function in the second variable. Moreover, from the definition of F , it is easy to see that all the assumptions H1, H2 and H3 are satisfied, and F is a pseudomonotone bifunction which is not monotone. In particular, from Remark 3.4, it follows that Assumption 3.1 holds. Now, take w 0 ∈ M fixed and a sequence {w
Assumption 3.2 holds. Therefore, Theorem 3.1 implies the existence of an equilibrium point for F .
Proximal Point for Equilibrium Problem
In this section and remainder of this paper, M will denote an Hadamard manifold with null sectional curvature. Following some ideas presented in [10] , we propose an approach of the proximal point algorithm for equilibrium problems on Hadamard manifolds with null sectional curvature, where the convergence result is obtained for bifunctions which are not necessarily monotone. This problem was proposed in [7] for the case of an Hadamard manifold and under monotonocity of the equilibrium bifunction.
Let us denote the equilibrium point set of F by EP(F,Ω) and, for λ > 0 and z ∈ Ω fixed, consider the bifunction
Now, we describe a proximal point algorithm to solve the equilibrium problem (3.1).
Algorithm 1. Take {λ k } a bounded sequence of positive real numbers.
1. Choose an initial point x 0 ∈ Ω;
3. Given x k , take as the next iterate any x k+1 ∈ Ω such that:
Remark 4.1. It is worth noting that the iterative process (4.2) has appeared first in [7] . If V ∈ X (M ), note that, for F given as in (3.2), this iterative process retrieves the proximal point method for the variational inequalities problem on Hadamard manifolds presented in [11] . In particular, the iterative process (4.2)
retrieves the proximal point method for minimization problems, see [12] or, more generally, the proximal point for vector fields both on Hadamard manifolds, see [13] .
Next results are useful to ensure the well-definition of Algorithm 1. In the remainder of this section, we assume that λ is a positive real number and z ∈ Ω, both fixed.
Proof. From (4.1), it is easy to see that
So, taking into account that F is θ-undermonotone, the desired result follows by combining last equality with (2.2) and assumption θ ≤ λ. Proof. From the definition of F λ,z in (4.1) and, taking into account that λ > 0 and F satisfies H1, to prove this lemma it is sufficient to ensure that, Ω ∋ y −→ g(y) := − exp
x y ∈ R is convex and lower semicontinuous. For the convexity of g, see Cruz Neto et al. [32, Theorem 1] . Note that g is a lower semicontinuous function, since g is a differentiable function.
also satisfies this assumption.
Proof. First of all, given z 0 ∈ M , consider a sequence {z k } ⊂ Ω such that {d(z k , z 0 )} converges to infinity as k goes to infinity. Using (4.1) with x = z k and y = z, we get
where the last inequality follows from the θ-undermonotonicity of F . Let us show that
Since M is an Hadamard manifold and
From (4.4) and Cauchy-Schwarz inequality,
Using (4.3) and (4.5), we have
Now, taking into account that θ < λ and {d(z k , z 0 )} converges to infinity as k goes to infinity, letting k goes to infinity, we obtain (
Hence, the desired results follows from the inequality (4.6) which concludes the proof.
Theorem 4.1. Assume that Assumption 3.2 holds and F is a θ-undermonotone bifunction with θ < λ.
Then, there exists an uniquex * ∈ Ω such that
Proof. From Lemma 4.1 it follows that F λ,z is monotone and, in particular, pseudomotone (this follows from Remarks 3.2). Moreover, Remark 3.4 implies that F λ,z satisfies Assumption 3.1 and Lemma 4.2 (resp. Lemma 4.3) tell us that F λ,z satisfies H2 (resp. Assumption 3.2). Hence, from Theorem 3.1 there exists, a
Let us suppose, by contradiction, that there existsx * 2 satisfying the last inequality. Then,
and
By summing the last two inequalities, we get
which contradicts inequality (2.2) and the proof is concluded.
Corollary 4.1. Assume that Assumption 3.2 holds and F is a θ-undermonotone bifunction. If {λ k } is a bounded sequence of positive real numbers such that θ < λ k , k ∈ N, then Algorithm 1 is well-defined.
Proof. It follows immediately from Theorem 4.1.
In the remainder of this paper we assume that the assumptions of the previous corollary hold and {x k } is a sequence generated from Algorithm 1. Taking into account that if Algorithm 1 terminates after a finite number of iterations, it terminates at an equilibrium point of F , from now on, we assume also that {x k } is an infinite sequence.
Convergence Analysis
In this section we present the convergence of the sequence {x k }.
Proposition 4.1. Let F be a pseudomonotone bifunction. Then,
Proof. From the definition of the iterate x k+1 and F k in (4.2) combined with (4.1), we obtain
Since F is pseudomonotone and EP (F, Ω) ⊂ Ω, the desired result follows from the last inequality.
) is said to be Fejér convergent to a nonempty set S ⊂ M iff for every z ∈ S,
The following result is well known and its proof is elementary.
Now, we present our main convergence result.
Theorem 4.2. Assume that F is pseudomonotone. The sequence {x k } converges to a point in EP(F, Ω).
Proof. Takex ∈ EP(F, Ω). Using inequality (2.1) with x i =x, x i+1 = x k and x i+2 = x k+1 , we obtain
Since F is pseudomonotone and x * ∈ EP(F, Ω), combining inequality (4.7) with last inequality and taking into account that d 2 (x k+1 , x k ) > 0, it follows that {x k } is Fejér convergent to the set EP(F, Ω). So, applying Proposition 4.2 with z k = x k , k ∈ N, and S = EP(F, Ω), we have that {x k } is a bounded sequence. In particular, from the Hopf-Rinow Theorem, there exists a subsequence {x kj } of {x k } converging to some point x * . Besides, as {λ k } also is a bounded sequence, without loss of generality we can suppose that {λ kj } is a subsequence of {λ k } converging to some λ * . Given y ∈ Ω and considering that the angle between the vectors exp −1
Now, from the definition of x kj +1 in (4.2) combined with (4.1) and (4.8), we get
Since F (· , y) is upper semicontinuous, {cos θ kj } is bounded and {d(x kj , x kj +1 )} (resp. {λ kj }) goes to zero (resp. λ * ) as j goes to infinity, we have
where the last inequality follows from (4.9). Therefore, the desired result follows of the arbitrary of y ∈ Ω.
Following the notations presented in [7] , let us consider, for each λ > 0 fixed, the following set-valued
In the particular case where F is monotone, J F λ is a firmly nonexpansive operator, i.e., for any x, y ∈ Ω,
, is nonincreasing, where γ 1 (t) and γ 2 (t) denote the geodesics joining x to J F λ (x) and y to J F λ (y), respectively. The proof of convergence presented in [7] is based exactly on this property. Now, we present an example just for illustrating that, as it is in the Euclidean context, the assumed conditions in our convergence result are weak to ensure the mentioned property. This is one of the reasons why, in the present paper, do not we followed the approach presented in [7] to obtain Theorem 4.2. 
It is easy to check that F is 1-undermonotone and pseudomonotone. Now, we show that the resolvent of the bifunction F is not firmly nonexpansive. Take x 0 = 1/2 and λ = 7. It follows that
Hence,
Therefore, by [33, Proposition 5] the resolvent J F λ is not firmly nonexpansive.
Finite Termination
In this section, following the ideas presented in [21] , we obtain an important result of finite termination for any sequence generated from Algorithm 1.
Next definition was introduced in the context of Hilbert spaces, see [21] . 
where S = EP(F, Ω).
Note that, if F is degenerate, i.e., exists a function φ : Ω → R such that F (x, y) = φ(y) − φ(x), then S = argmin Ω φ. In this particular case, if φ is convex and ρ = 1, Definition 4.2 reduces to
This notion has been introduced in [20] , in the Riemannian context, and says that S is a weak sharp minima set for the minimization problem min{φ(x) : x ∈ Ω}, (4.13)
with modulus α > 0.
Now, we present a finite convergence result for the sequence {x k }.
Theorem 4.3. Assume that S is a non-empty set, the inequality (4.11) holds with ρ ∈]0, 1] and the sequence {x k } converges to x * ∈ S. Then, x * is reached in a finite number of iterations, i.e., there exists a number
Proof. Assume that dist(x k+1 , S) > 0 for all k ∈ N. From (4.11), we obtain
for all k ∈ N andλ = sup k∈N {λ k }. From the last inequality, we get
Since ρ − 1 ≤ 0 and dist(x k+1 , S) → 0, it follows that d(x k , x k+1 ) 0, which contradicts the fact that {x k } is a convergent sequence. Therefore, the result of the theorem is true.
Remark 4.2.
i) Note that the last theorem extend the finite termination result in [19] to minimization problems whose constrained set is not necessarily whole manifold. This holds because the minimization problem, as (4.13), can be formulated as an equilibrium problem where the bifunction, associated to this particular problem, satisfies (4.11) with ρ = 1 ∈]0, 1], or equivalently, S = argmin Ω φ is a weak sharp minima set for the minimization problem (4.13) (see (4.12)). For a characterization of the condition (4.12), in the case of convex minimization problems on Hadamard manifolds, see [20] .
ii) In regards to other problems that may be interpreted as equilibrium problems, we emphasize that our resulted of finite convergence can be applied for the proximal point methods to finding singularities of single valued monotone vector fields (see [22] ), multivalued monotone vector fields (see [13] ) and, hence, for the variational inequality problem (see [23] ) among others, when the bifunction associated to each of these problems satisfies (4.11) with ρ ∈]0, 1]. We intend, in future work, to identify the condition (4.11) in each particular instance listed earlier, and to investigate possible characterizations.
In order to illustrate the result of Theorem 4.3, let us consider the elementary Example 4.1. In this case, S = EP (F, Ω) = {1} and
where ρ = 1 and τ = 1/2. Therefore, the sequence {x k } converges to x * = 1 in a finite number of iterations.
Worthwhile Transitions to Variational Traps on an Hadamard Manifold
In this section, devoted to applications, we consider stability and change dynamics. They are everywhere.
For example, among many others, habits and routines formation and break, and exploration-exploitation stability/change issues (where exploration refers to discovery, search, innovation. . . ). A recent "variational rationality" approach in Behavioral Sciences (see [25, 26] ) modelized and unified a huge list of such stability and change dynamics. It shows how a succession of worthwhile stays and changes can converge to a variational trap (to be defined below). In an important paper, Colao et al. [7] gives, first in a static framework, and then using an approximation process, three applications of equilibrium problems (EP) on Hadamard manifolds: mixed variational inequalities (MVI), fixed points (FP) of set valued mappings, and Nash equilib-rium (NE) in non cooperative games. In this last section related to applications, we show that their approach represents a special, but very important benchmark case, of a worthwhile stability and change dynamic on an
Hadamard manifold. The Variational rationality (VR) approach (see [25, 26] ) rests on three main concepts: 6) show the Variational rationality flavor of all the hypothesis done in this paper; 7) Finally, we interpret exact and inexact solutions to the equilibrium problem in variational rationality terms.
Critic of the Nash Equilibrium Static Concept in a Dynamic Setting
The Variational rationality (VR) approach (see [25, 26] ) makes a critic of an optimum, and more generally of a Nash equilibrium, as a purely static concept, a stability concept, where agents, being at equilibrium, prefer to stay there than to move, while they do not know why they are there, by pure change, an event of zero measure. . . . On the contrary, the (VR) approach urges to focus attention, for dynamical applications in Behavioral Sciences, on traps, and more precisely variational traps. These variational traps satisfy two conditions:
i) stability issue: they are stable with respect to worthwhile changes (stationary traps): being there, at equilibrium, agents prefer to stay than to move because to stay is worthwhile and to move is not.
Nash equilibrium are also stable positions, not with respect to worthwhile changes, but with respect to advantages to change (ignoring resistance to change, in a world without frictions). It is as if agents, at the very beginning of the process, by luck, find them in the trap;
ii) reachability and desirability issues with respect to a given subset of initial positions: traps must be also reachable and desirable to reach, following a succession of worthwhile single stays and changes (a worthwhile transition), moving from the initial position to the trap. In this general case, the agent is not in the trap at the beginning of the process, as a static equilibrium supposes. Then, the agent prefers to move towards the trap than to stay, following a succession of worthwhile single stays and changes.
This shows that a Nash equilibrium is a very specific case of a variational trap, which is difficult to justify in dynamic settings. A position can be stable, like a Nash equilibrium, but will have no practical sense if it is not reachable from the initial position. In this case this is an empty concept.
Examples of Traps in Behavioral Sciences
In Behavioral Sciences, Alber and Heward in [34] noticed that "relatively simple response is necessary to enter the trap, yet once entered, the trap cannot be resisted in creating general behavior changes". Among Traps refer to rather easy to reach (feasibility and desirability issues) and difficult to leave (stability issue) positions. They generalize critical points, optima, Nash equilibria, fixed points, Pareto optima, and mixed variational equilibria, as reachable, desirable and stable end points of a dynamical process. They can represent habits, routines, rules, conventions,. . . .
Hadamard Manifolds. The Modelization of the Repeated Regeneration of
Resources.
A striking advantage to consider equilibrium problems on an Hadamard manifold is to allow to consider, each period, repeated constraints, which balance the repeated depletion and regeneration of resources, helping to modelize human behavior in a realistic dynamic setting. An important constraint, almost always neglected in the economic literature, is that the agent must spend, and then, regenerate his depleted energy as time evolves (see the Ego-depletion theory in Psychology, Baumeister in [38] ). To satisfy their needs, agents must spend effort and energy to gather means in order to be able to acquire (produce, buy, sell, eliminate, . . . )
final goods which will satisfy partially these needs. Then, each period, the lost energy must be recovered.
Consider an agent who performs, each period, a list of activities x = (x i , x j ), where activities i ∈ I produce daily vital energy for the agent (like eating, resting, holidays, sports, healthy activities, arts, . . . ), giving further motivations to act, and activities j ∈ J consume energy (working, thinking, . . . ). Let e i + (x i ) ≥ 0 be the energy produced by doing action x i ∈ R and e j − (x j ) ≥ 0 be the energy consumed by doing action x j ∈ R. Then, the regeneration of vital energy imposes the constraint Σ i∈I e i + (
Production and consumption functions of energy can be increasing and convex (the more an agent carries out an activity, the more he produces and consumes energy, at an increasing rate). In the quadratic case, the expression Σ i∈I (x i ) 2 − Σ j∈J (x j ) 2 = E > 0 defines an hyperboloid. A more realistic example can be given where production functions of energy are increasing, concave, and consumption functions of energy are increasing convex. More generally each activity can both consume and produce some energy.
The VR Approach. A Model for Worthwhile Changes and Variatonal Traps
It is time to define and modelize, right now, the three main (VR) concepts, worthwhile single changes and stays, worthwhile transitions, and variational traps. The (VR) variational rationality approach [25, 26] advocates that agents are "variationally rational". Following the famous Prospect theory with riskless choice in Economics (Tversky and Kahneman [45] ) this "variational rationality" approach considers that agents look at changes, rather than at endowments, stocks and wealth to evaluate their current utility. Then, it goes a step further, in a true dynamic context, where the past, the present and the future matter to determine a behavior (a succession of actions). It emphasizes, first, that the main variational question is "should I stay, should I go?". Then, it advocates that, a lot of times, agents do not optimize (contrary to Kahneman and Tversky [46] , who suppose that they do). Instead it considers that agents can "muddle through" (see Lindboom [47] in Political Sciences), behave as bounded and procedural rational agents (Simon [48] , in Economics and Management), as well as "practical rational" agents (Bratman [49] in Philosophy, Wooldridge [50] , in Artificial Intelligence). To unify all these different points of view in a lot of different disciplines, the variational rationality approach considers that, each step of a behavioral process (defined as a succession of actions), an agent tries to perform worthwhile changes or stays.
Let us summarize very succintly the main aspects of this recent "variational rationality" approach. For simplification, let us consider the case of an agent. For more complex situations and a lot of variants, see [25, 26] . The case of a game with interrelated agents will be examined below, to compare our findings with those of [7] . Given an agent and his current experience e ∈ E (which depends of the sequence of his past actions including the last action z which has been done, his motivation to change M e (z, y) ∈ R from repeating the old action z, to do a new action y, must be higher than a choosen and satisficing worthwhile to change ratio λ > 0 time his resistance to change R e (z, y) ∈ R + . This ratio is adaptive. Then, the core of this construction is the following "worthwhile to change or stay" inequality: if z is the last past action which have been done and y is a new action planned to be done in a near future, it is worthwhile to change (z y) than to stay (z z) iff M e (z, y) ≥ λR e (z, y) where: The worthwhile to change rather than to stay payoff, at z, is ∆ λ,e (z, y) = M e (z, y) − λR e (z, y) and the worthwhile "change rather than to stay" set, at z is W λ,e (z) = {y ∈ Ω, ∆ λ,e (z, y) ≥ 0}.
The goal of this variational approach is to examine the dynamics of a succession of worthwhile stays and changes x k+1 ∈ W λ k+1,e k (x k ), λ k+1 > 0, k ∈ N, where e k = E(X k ) ∈ E is the experience of the agent at step k, which depends of the history of past actions X k = (x 0 , x 1 , . . . , x k ), as well as, in more complex cases, the history of the actions of other agents and the environment. Each step, given the current action x k , the agent chooses first a satisficing worthwhile to change ratio λ k+1 > 0 (in order to consider a change as worthwhile this step) and, then, tries to find a new worthwhile to change action x k+1 ∈ W λ k+1,e k (x k ), which must belong to the worthwhile to change set.
The main questions are, depending on the evolving context (the given parameters, each step): iii) how efficient is this process: does the end is a critical point, a local maximum or minimum, an approximate equilibrium, an equilibrium . . . ?
Payoff functions. Let g e : M → R be a payoff function (performance, revenue, profit . . . ) to be maximized and f e : M → R be a cost function, or an unsatisfied need function to be minimized, which, both, will depend of the experience e ∈ E of the agent.
Advantages to changes. In the separable case, advantages to change are A e (z, y) = g e (y) − g e (z) or A e (z, y) = f e (z) − f e (y). More generally the advantage to change function is a bifunction A e : M × M → R.
Costs to be able to change and costs to be able to stay. Given the experience e ∈ E, costs to be able to change (moving from being able to repeat the last action z to be able to do a new action y) are C e (z, y). Costs to be able to stay at z ( i.e to repeat action z) are C e (z, z) ≥ 0.
Inconvenients to change. Let I e = I e (z, y) = C e (z, y) − C e (z, z) ≥ 0 be the inconvenients to change between repeating the same old action z, and doing a new action y. They represent, given the agent's experience e ∈ E, the difference between costs to be able to change C e (z, y) and costs to be able to stay,
Stationary traps (strong and weak). Let λ * > 0 and e * ∈ E be a given satisficing worthwhile to change ratio and a given experience. Then, x * ∈ Ω is a strong stationary trap if
This means that it is not worthwhile to move from x * , i.e, the worthwhile to change set shrinks to a point, W λ * ,e * (x * ) = {x * }. This refers to a stability issue, which takes also care of some resistance to change at x * .
Notice that a (strong) equilibrium x * ∈ Ω will not consider any resistance to change, and will refer to the truncated condition not motivation to change condition M e * (x * , y) < 0, for all y = x * . A weak stationary trap is such that
Variational traps. An action x * ∈ X is a strong (weak) variational trap with respect to an initial action x 0 if, starting from x 0 , it exists a succession of "changes and stays"
defined by a convergent sequence of satisficing worthwhile to change ratio and experiences,
such that, i) x k converges to this point x * (it is worthwhile to move to this trap x * , starting from x 0 );
ii) x * ∈ Ω is a strong stationary trap, W λ * ,e * (x * ) = {x * } (weak stationary trap).
In general a variational trap will be relative to a source set, an initial subset of actions Ω 0 ⊂ M , instead of a given initial action Ω 0 = {x 0 } . This means that, the trap is worthwhile to reach, starting from any point of the source set Ω 0 . Notice that the second condition ii) defines only a strong stationnary trap (a stability issue, when inertia matters). The first condition tells us that it is worthwhile to move to this trap x * , starting from x 0 (a feasible and acceptable reachability issue).
The Variational Trap Problem in the Euclidian Space
The variational trap problem refers to the possible convergence of a succession of worthwhile single stays and changes, moving from a stationary trap to the next, ending in a variational trap.
• Equilibrium problems and Variational rationality equilibrium problems. Consider the case where the space of actions is the Euclidian manifold M = Ω = R n . The equilibrium problem (EP) given in (3.1)) refers, in Mathematics, to costs and losses minimization. Given a differentiable bifunction A : Ω × Ω → R, the variational rationality equilibrium problem (VR-EP) refers, in Behavioral Sciences, to gains and advantages to change maximization (see [25, 26] ). It is: find x * ∈ Ω such that the possible advantage to change A(x * , y) be non positive, i.e, A(x * , y) ≤ 0, for all y ∈ Ω. When F = −A, the (VR-EP) problem is equivalent to the (EP) equilibrium problem. For easier comparisons with [7] , start from the Mathematical equilibrium problem (EP). In this last section devoted to applications, losses and advantages to change do not depend of experience, i.e, F e (x, y) = F (x, y) and A e (x, y) = A(x, y)
for all e ∈ E. The simplest separable and experience independent case, where
defines a minimum x * ∈ Ω of the unsatisfied need function f , or a maximum of the payoff function g over Ω.
• Changes. Let Ω be the space of actions and consider an agent who, each period, looks at three consecutive actions, x, z, y ∈ Ω, where x and z represent past actions, the two last actions he has done, and y is the future action he plans to do. Hence, in this specific context, before looking at doing the future action y, the current experience of the agent is e = (x, z) ∈ Ω × Ω = E. If the agent plans to do an action y which is less similar to the past action than the present action, we will suppose that his costs to be able to do this new action y increases with respect to the cost he has spend to be able to do the last past action z. In the opposite case this cost will be higher.
• Pleasure and Pain functions. In the specific context of this paper, the equilibrium problem (EP)
on an Hadamard manifold, identify pleasure (utility) to advantages to change, U [A e ] = A e , and pain (desutility) to inconvenient to change, D [I e ] = I e .
• Advantages to changes. They are modelized as the bifunction A : M × M → R. It is a constant function which does not depend of experience e ∈ E.
• Losses to change. They refer to the bifunction F : M × M → R, where F (z, y) = −A(z, y).
• Costs to be able to change and costs to be able to stay. They are C e (z, y) ≥ 0 and C e (z, z) ≥ 0.
Notice that costs to be able to stay are not necessary zero.
• Inconvenients to change as Tikhonov regularization terms. In the context of this paper, we modelize inconvenients to change I e (z, y) = C e (z, y) − C e (z, z) ≶ 0 as a Tikhonov perturbation term,
given by I e (z, y) = z − x, y − z , where the experience e = (x, z) of the agent concerns only his last two past actions, x and z (both have been done) It turns out that, in Behavioral Sciences, it is identical to the "Cosinus similarity" index, which is a measure of similarity between the two vectors u = z − x, and y − z , where v = z − x represents the present change in past experience, and y − z the future change. As a scalar product, it is equal, up to the sign (+, or -), to the distance d(x, z) between x and z, time the distance d(z, y p ) between z and the projection y p of y on the lign L(u) supported by the
The interpretation is clear: having in mind that, x = two periods less recent past action, z = one period most recent past action, and y = one period future action, the costs to be able to change rather than to stay increase (decrease) if the dissimilarity between the future action y and the second past action x is higher (lower) than the dissimilarity between the last past action z and the past action x.
This index shows in a striking way how past experience matters much to determine future costs to be able to change.
• Worthwhile changes. Let ∆ λ,e (z, y) = A(z, y)−ξI e (z, y) = − [F (z, y) + λI e (z, y)] be the "worthwhile to change rather than to stay" payoff of the agent. In this paper, when F (z, y) = −A(z, y), M = R n and I e (z, y) = z − x, y − z , λ > 0 is a satisficing worthwhile to change ratio, and e = (x, z) ∈ E modelizes experience (the sequence of two actions he has done before, including the current action, done just before). The present paper considers the specific case of short memory, where the agent "remembers" only his two last past actions x, z. A change from the last past action z (yet done) to the new action y (to be done), is worthwhile if ∆ λ,e (z, y) ≥ 0. This means that advantages to change A(z, y) from z to y are higher than λ > 0 times the experience dependent inconvenients to change I e (z, y), i.e, A(z, y) ≥ λI e (z, y) which is equivalent to a non negative sum of losses to change plus the inconvenients to change, F (z, y) + λI e (z, y) ≥ 0.
• Successions of worthwhile changes. At period k, the two last past actions and future actions are
Then, a change from z = x k to y = x k+1 is worthwhile if:
A succession x k of worthwhile single stays and changes satisfies ∆ λ k+1, e k (x k , x k+1 ) ≥ 0 for all k ∈ N.
To fit with the mathematics, we can note λ k > 0 instead of λ k+1 > 0. In the second mathematical case λ k > 0 is given, and refers to an heritage from the past and current situations; In the first behavioral case, the satisficing worthwhile to change ratio λ k+1 > 0 is chosen, and refers to a future change from
which is a variational rationality representation of resolvent of F defined in (4.10). They represent the set of weak stationary traps related to experience e = (x, z) := (z − x) ∈ E. where e refers to z − x.
Proof. Take y = x. From e = z − x and I e (z, y) = e, y − z , we get
Hence, taking into account that z ∈ J 
and the affirmation is proved.
• A strong (weak) variational trap x * ∈ Ω is such that, given a worthwhile to change process {x k }
converging to x * , we have:
The Case of an Hadamard Manifold
• The consideration of regeneration of resources constaints. As said before, the context of Hadamard manifolds is fundamental for the consideration of dynamic problems. It allows to consider regeneration of resource constraints, which are almost always neglected in dynamic models, where the state space is an Euclidian space.
• The modelization of inconvenients to change. The main "variational rational" concept whose formulation changes when the space of actions moves from M = R n to an Hadamard manifold is the inconvenient to change function I e (z, y) = C e (z, y) − C e (z, z) which passes from
The interpretation is exactly the same as before and needs not to be repeated because (see Proposition 2.1) the comparison theorem for triangles establishes a diffeomorphism between a geodesic triangle ∆(x, y, z) on the Hadamard manifold and a corresponding one, ∆(x ′ , y ′ , z ′ ) in the Euclidian space
As before costs to be able to change depend of geodesic distances.
• The variational trap problem.
We only need to verify that, moving from a weak stationary trap to a new one, is a worthwhile change.
Then, the Euclidian versions of Theorems 4.2 and 4.3 show that limits of a succession of worthwhile changes x k from a weak stationary trap
The conditionality assumption (18) is a weak sharp minimum condition. It supposes that x * is a weak variational trap, related to the new resistance to change function R(z, y) = dist ρ (x, S); see the next paragraph.
The resolvant Lemma shows that it is worthwhile to move from a weak variational trap to the next.
• Finite termination is a very important property for a model which wants to modelize human behavior in a nice way, because, in the long run, we are dead! Convergence in infinity time is of no use to describe a goal directed behavior who requires to hope to reach a goal in finite time.
5.7
The Variational Rationality Flavor of all the Hypothesis Done in this Paper.
Let us show that all the hypothesis made in this paper have a strong variational rationality flavor. The variational rationality (VR) approach considers, among other basic concepts, advantages to change A(x, y) from x to y. Losses to change from x to y, F (x, y), refer to the opposite, the losses to change from x to y which is F (x, y) = −A(x, y). Within the (VR) approach, the equilibrium problem in a Riemannian context is:
Then, an equilibrium x * ∈ Ω is such that there is no advantages to change (there is no gain to deviate from x * ), or there are losses to change, moving from it to an other position. Definition 3.1 considers a loss function
This loss function F is said to be,
(1) monotone, iff F (x, y) + F (y, x) ≤ 0 for all x, y ∈ Ω, i.e A(x, y) + A(y, x) ≥ 0 for all x, y ∈ Ω. This means that, moving from x to y and coming back, cannot generate a global loss to change along this cycle (in term of advantage to change). Notice that costs to be able to change are excluded from the very definition of advantages to change;
(2) pseudomonotone, iff for each (x, y) ∈ Ω × Ω, F (x, y) ≥ 0 implies F (y, x) ≤ 0, i.e., A(x, y) ≤ 0 implies A(y, x) ≥ 0.This means that it is always advantageous to move from x to y or the reverse. This is a no strong indecision hypothesis; (3) θ-undermonotone, iff there exists θ ≥ 0 such that
, i.e., A(x, y) + A(y, x) ≥ −θd(x, y) 2 , for all (x, y) ∈ Ω × Ω. This means that the global advantage to change from x to y and to come back cannot be too low, the more actions x, y are similar, the less it is. This is a low resistance to change hypothesis.
These three properties are trivially true in the separable and experience independent advantages to change
, where g and f are the "to be increased" or "to be decreased" payoff functions, for a single agent. In the general case F = −A is pseudomonotone if, having an advantage to change from x to y, there is no advantage to change from y to x. Consider now the case of interacting agents I playing a Nash non cooperative game (see [7] ), where the profile of their actions is x = (x 1 , x 2 , .., x i−1 , x i , x i+1 , ....x m ). In this setting, player i ∈ I performs an action x i ∈ K i , while his rivals −i = (j = i) carry out the other actions x −i = (x j , j = i), and each player i considers his unsatisfied need function f i (x 1 , x 2 , ..,
., x i−1 , x i , x i+1 , ....x m )] be the perceived global loss function of the players, where each player is supposed to be able to only perceive what will be his
the only agent to move from the profile of old actions (x 1 , x 2 , ..,
given that he supposes that the other players repeat their old actions.
In regard to the assumptions H1, H2, H3 on the loss functions, we have H1) F (x, x) = 0 for each x ∈ Ω means that there is no loss to stay;
H2)
For every x ∈ Ω, y → F (x, y) is convex and lower semicontinuous, i.e., the advantages to change function y −→ A(x, y) is concave and upper semicontinuous; H3) For every y ∈ Ω, x → F (x, y) is upper semicontinuous, i.e., the advantages to change x → A(x, y) is lower semicontinuous.
Lower (upper) and upper (lower) semicontinuity assumptions are natural regularity assumptions for loss (gain) functions. Only convexity (concavity) of the loss (gain) function y → F (x, y) needs some comments.
Given the past action x, A(x, y) = −F (x, y) is the gain to move from x to y. Concavity of A(x, ·) refers to the traditional assumption of decreasing marginal gains (a standard saturation effect).
Consider now the remaining hypothesis. It is not easy to give a variational interpretation of Assumption 3.1. However, let us notice that when F is pseudomonotone, Assumption 3.1 is satisfied. Then, for an interpretation, we will refer to pseudomonotonicity. Now, Assumption 3.2 means that any (unbounded) sequence z k ⊂ Ω whose distance to an initial position goes to infinity, have, in term of the (VR) approach, an aspiration point such that, after some time k ≥ k 0 , there is an advantage to change from any z k to the aspiration point x * (see Soubeyran [26] , Flores et al. [51] and Luc and Soubeyran [52] , for applications).
This aspiration point represents a desirable end for an unbounded sequence going to infinity. Its existence means that for any trajectory which goes far away (to infinity), agents can hope to improve their current situation. This is strongly related to the so called theory of hope (Snyder [53] ).
The last hypothesis, given in Definition 4.2, consider well conditionned bifunctions. It supposes that a non degenerated F is ρ-conditioned, i.e, that there exist positive number ρ > 0 and τ > 0 such that −F (x, P S (x)) ≥ τ dist ρ (x, S), x ∈ Ω, where S = EP (F, Ω). This hypothesis is very natural within the variational rationality context. It means that it is always worthwhile to change from any point x ∈ Ω to the projection P S (x) of x on the subset S = EP (F, Ω) of equilibrium points. In this case, advantages to change from x to P S (x) are A(x, P S (x)) = −F (x, P S (x)) and resistance to change is R(x, y) = D [dist(x, S)].
This supposes that any change from x ∈ Ω to P S (x) ∈ S = EP (F, Ω) is worthwhile, in a specific sense:
A(x, P S (x)) ≥ τ dist ρ (x, S), for all x ∈ Ω.
Exact And Approximate Solutions: Reversing The Logic
In this Section 5, we have shown that the equilibrium problem, with a Tikhonov regularization term, on an Hadamard manifold, is a particular and nice instance of a very general variational trap problem, which appears in Behavioral Sciences in Psychology, Economics, Management Sciences, Game theory, Decision theory, Philosophy, Artificial Intelligence, Political Sciences.
The "variational rationality" approach (see [25, 26] ) reverses the logic of what is an exact or inexact (approximate) solution, taking the point of view of, either Behavioral Sciences or Mathematics. If we interpret the famous Tikhonov perturbation term z − x, y − z of a pertubed Nash equilibrium problem as a cosinus measure of dissimilarity of two vectors in an inner product space, and, then, as a dissimilarity cost to change from one direction of change to an other one, then:
1) in Behavioral Sciences, the (VR) approach, where costs to be able to change play a major role and modelize inertia, frictions and learning, the natural solutions of a perturbed Nash equilibrium problem are variational traps, reachable, in a worthwhile way, as maximal elements of a relation of worthwhile changes, not Nash equilibria, which ignore costs to be able to change (frictions), once you are there, at the Nash equilibrium (where frictions are absent, but why?). The exact solutions become variational traps. The justification is that they include costs to be able to change in their definition. The approximate solutions become Nash equilibria which ignore costs to be able to change in their strict definition;
2) in Mathematics, perturbed Nash equilibrium problems have been seen in the opposite way: variational traps (as solutions of perturbed Nash equilibrium problems) are seen as approximate solutions of the exact solutions of a Nash equilibrium problem, with a perturbation term.
Conclusions
In this paper, we provided a sufficient condition to obtain the existence of solutions of EP. We presented a proximal algorithm for EP whose iterative process has been considered in [7, Theorem 4.10] . Our convergence analysis is restricted to Hadamard manifold with null sectional curvature and extends the convergence result presented in [7] to the case where the bifunction of EP is not necessarily monotone. We obtained a condition on the bifunction that retrieves the notion of weak sharp minima, and we prove the finite termination of any sequence generated from our iterative process. In particular, the finite termination result presented in [19] is extended to minimization problems whose constrained set is not necessarily the whole manifold.
We also obtain a finite convergence result for the proximal point method in order to find singularities of single valued monotone vector fields (see [22, 13] and, hence, for the variational inequality problem (see [23] ).
We gave an application to a recent unifying approach of a lot of stability and change theories in Behavioral Sciences, the "Variational rationality approach of human behavior", where an equilibrium problem appears to modelize how an agent can reach a final equilibrium, following a sequence of worthwhile changes and temporary stays from a stationary trap to the next one. As future work, we intend to propose a approach of the proximal point algorithm for equilibrium problems to case that M is an Hadamard manifold with negative sectional curvature, also we intend to establish necessary and sufficient conditions for the hypothesis of our Theorem 4.3 to occur.
